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copy.

10 October 1963

ER 63-7714

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Survey of Personnel Security

1. In accordance with your instruction of 27 September 1963, I have had a survey made of the status of personnel security within CIA. The report of my findings is attached at Tab A. The report is summarized in the paragraphs that follow, and recommendations appear in paragraph 15.

Purpose of the Survey

2. The purpose of the survey was to determine whether CIA regulations and procedures for maintaining personnel security (a) are adequate; (b) are known, understood, and followed; and (c) are effective.

Scope of the Survey

3. We interviewed the Director of Security and certain of his senior officers, the Director of Personnel, the Chief of the Medical Staff; the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, and a cross-section of office heads within the DD/I, DD/S, DD/P, and DD/S&T. We asked office heads to identify to us strong and weak supervisors, without specifying which was which. We interviewed in excess of 40 supervisors representing a wide range of grades and of responsibilities.

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

**SECRET**

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Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

We asked the Director of Personnel, the Chief of the Medical Staff, and supervisors to identify to us personnel who had married, traveled abroad, taken external training, written for publication, taken extended leave, or had any sort of personal experience that required the attention of the Office of Security. We then reviewed the security files of these individuals--some 40 in all. We also inquired at some length into the polygraph program, the security reinvestigation program, the security research program, and into the activities of the Personnel Security Division in general. Members of my staff now inspecting CIA installations in the Far East have been instructed to take particular note of personnel security and to report their findings to the Chief of Station. Preliminary reports from stations inspected to date have been generally favorable. The details of findings will be available upon the return of the inspectors to Headquarters.

#### Summary of Findings

4. The results of our investigation support the conclusion that the quality of personnel security in CIA is excellent. This does not rule out the possibility of a defection from our ranks to the opposition. Those interviewed were virtually unanimous in agreeing that no system of security controls can be devised that would detect, with certainty

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

**SECRET**

and in advance, the sudden decision to defect. Experience has demonstrated, however, that the poor security risk becomes so through the cumulative effect of a combination of personal and official circumstances and that these circumstances are discernible.

5. The primary safeguard against the poor security risk is pre-employment screening. This involves a thorough check of qualifications, suitability, and security acceptability. The job is done conscientiously, and I am convinced that we have an effective program for identifying and disqualifying the individual with potential security vulnerabilities. The fact that subsequent security reinvestigations on a fairly large scale have discovered almost no "bad apples" is a good measure of the effectiveness of pre-employment procedures. Of particular significance in this regard is the fact that the Office of Security over the years has resisted pressures to accept for employment individuals on whom the initial security investigation had not been completed.

6. Once the individual passes the major barrier of the initial security investigation and is employed, he is thereafter subjected to a series of lesser hurdles that permit repeated reviews of the status of his security. For example, he must

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these acts requires the approval of the Office of Security and each involves a review of his accumulated security file. The review of files, selected by ourselves rather than the Office of Security, revealed no instance of non-compliance with these requirements.

25X1 7. The Security reinvestigation program that has been under way for over two years is a sound innovation. It supplements the reinvestigations that result from reviews of accumulated security files, from major changes in assignment, or from a change in the employee's clearance status  The program is going slowly because of the press of current work. The program is pursued during slack periods and set aside during heavy workload periods. The near-zero rate of unfavorable findings suggests that the reinvestigation program can safely be pursued at its present level.

8. The work of the Security Research Staff is particularly noteworthy. It concerns itself with problems having possible counter-intelligence implications. It can and does take the time to inquire in depth, to review, and to analyze. It provides an additional check on the effectiveness of routine personnel security measures.

9. The Agency's polygraph program is one of our major security strengths. The degree to which it is accepted by Agency employees stems largely from the care with which the program is administered. It was initiated only after a careful R&D effort and lengthy experimentation

with volunteers; it is used as an aid to investigation and with discrimination; the polygraph records are maintained separately within the Office of Security. A memorandum prepared by the Director of Security regarding the polygraph program appears at Tab B.

10. Much of the effectiveness of the Agency's security program stems from the fact that it is centrally controlled and administered by the Office of Security. The Office is staffed with professionals who have made a career of security. The decisions that must be made in cases where security is the paramount issue are made by those who are best qualified by training and experience to make them. As a corollary, the inviolability of security files is a strong plus. The employee who comes into possession of information with security implications can pass it on to the Office of Security knowing that it will be tightly held and appropriately used.

11. We seriously doubt that high security standards result solely from regulations or procedures administered by the Office of Security. Good personnel security results from the cooperation of all concerned. We were particularly impressed with the extent of coordination, often informal and not covered by regulations, that exists among the Office of Security, the Office of Personnel, and the Medical Staff. There are, of course, problem cases that are almost solely the concern of Security. Often, however, the problems are of

concern to all three and solutions are found through the ad hoc committee approach.

12. As is apparent from the above, we found much to commend in the personnel security program as it is administered by professionals who devote their full time to it. We found much less consistency at the level of the supervisor who concerns himself with the security of his employees only "in addition to his other duties." In general, we found that the strong supervisor took serious account of personnel security; the weak supervisor did not. Supervisory weaknesses as regards personnel security are most pronounced among supervisors of relatively low GS grade. In my opinion, there is need for a program of indoctrination and reindoctrination of supervisors in their responsibilities as supervisors, including their responsibility in personnel security matters, and I have so recommended in paragraph 15.

13. We found other relatively minor weaknesses in the personnel security picture--some of which can be improved upon, some of which have no easy solution. For those to which we do see possible solutions, recommendations appear in paragraph 15.

a. The first barrier to penetration is the concealment of the identities of our personnel. There has been a progressive erosion of security in this regard.

SECRET

b. The disgruntled ex-employee is a potential security hazard. The Office of Security tries to keep a check on those known to be particularly bitter, but there is a definite limit on what can be done in this regard.

c. The employee, particularly at the clerical level, who is sent overseas within months of entering on duty represents a security weakness. Such employees have not yet identified themselves with the Agency and have not yet developed the security disciplines that come from living in our security environment. A similar problem exists with respect to the person whose first assignment in the Agency is to one of the particularly sensitive components.

d. There is a tendency to rid oneself of an unsuitable employee by transferring him to another component without telling the new supervisor of the employee's weaknesses. More attention to the program of consolidating sensitive personnel information into central files will help to alleviate this problem.

e. Another soft spot is the variation in procedures for keeping ourselves informed of the whereabouts of an employee who is absent from duty. The regulations specify that the supervisor shall attempt to locate an employee who fails to

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report for work but does not prescribe the time limit within which this must be accomplished. We found appreciable differences among the policies of Operating Divisions with respect to the employee who takes leave enroute home from an overseas assignment. Of additional concern is the employee who resigns and remains overseas.

f. Military personnel who are detailed to the Agency without submitting to our clearance procedures are potential security hazards. You are already well aware of this problem. My investigation did not uncover significant information not already made available to you in correspondence that I have reviewed.

14. I think it important to note that personnel security cannot be dealt with as an entity unto itself. Personnel security, employee morale, and the Agency image are inseparably bound together. If the individual takes pride in his contribution, however small, to the accomplishments of an Agency for which he has respect, his morale will be good. The individual with good morale, engendered by respect for his Agency, will do his best to protect the public image of the Agency. It is this intangible factor, more than the deterrent effect of regulations and procedures, that yields good personnel security. CIA has good employee morale and the resultant excellent personnel security.

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Recommendations

15. It is recommended:


a. That the Agency initiate a formal program for indoctrination and periodic reindoctrination of supervisory personnel in their responsibilities as supervisors--particularly as regards personnel security.

b. That heads of offices and chiefs of stations and bases be reminded of the need for particular attention to the problems and close supervision of employees new to the Agency.

c. That additional impetus be given the program for consolidating sensitive personnel information, particularly as regards input from unofficial files held by the employee's parent component.

d. That a uniform deadline be established within which the supervisor tries to locate a missing employee.

e. That uniform procedures be established and followed for controlling private foreign travel upon returning from overseas assignment--to include a requirement that employees report in by telephone immediately upon returning to the States.



J. S. Earman  
Inspector General

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**Attachments:**

- Tab A - Report of Findings
- Tab B - Polygraph Program

- 9 -

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**SECRET**

SECRET

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB A . . . . .	Volume Statistics and Profile of CIA Polygraph Staff
TAB B . . . . .	Individuals Disapproved Based on Polygraph Examinations
TAB C . . . . .	Polygraph Provides Investigative Leads
TAB D . . . . .	Initial Routine Polygraph Testing Did Not Develop Derogatory Information
TAB E . . . . .	Allegations Against Employee Resolved by Polygraph
TAB F . . . . .	Special Cases Containing Multiple Security Problems

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6


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Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

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POLYGRAPH PROGRAM  
OF THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This report provides pertinent statistics regarding the Agency Polygraph Program, a profile of the CIA Polygraph Staff, and sample cases illustrating a number of ways in which the polygraph has been useful as an interrogation aid.



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INDIVIDUALS DISAPPROVED  
BASED ON POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS

TAB B

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25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6  
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**POLYGRAPH PROVIDES INVESTIGATIVE LEADS**

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Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6  
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25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6



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INITIAL ROUTINE POLYGRAPH TESTING DID  
NOT DEVELOP DEROGATORY INFORMATION

(But when supplied subsequent leads through  
other means, polygraph developed derogatory  
information leading to separation of employee)

TAB D

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

SECRET

ALLEGATIONS AGAINST EMPLOYEE, RESOLVED  
BY POLYGRAPH

(Polygraph resolves adverse allegations against  
employees in favor of employee.)

TAB E

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25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

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**SPECIAL CASES CONTAINING MULTIPLE SECURITY  
PROBLEMS**

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25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040035-6

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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